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Milbank’s milieu: theorisations of truth, faith and reason 
 
Alex Deagon 
 
Abstract 
 
This article seeks to clarify and theorise three fundamental themes in the work of John 
Milbank: truth, faith and reason.  In his work, Milbank often uses these terms in ambiguous 
ways, so the terminology requires clarity to facilitate further productive discussion.  It is 
found that truth refers to the revelation of the divine relations in the Trinity, and these 
correspond with human relations when this revelation is apprehended by faith through 
participation.  Faith means trust or persuasion, such that when the divine is graciously 
revealed, the mind is transformed and persuaded to participate in the divine relations.  This 
faith is reconciled with reason, or logos, the divine word which is Christ and is the ultimate 
revelation of the Trinity through the Incarnation, which produces a reason that leads to peace 
based in faith. 
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This article seeks to provide a clarifying theorisation of three key themes in the work 
of theologian John Milbank: truth, faith and reason.  It is important to properly explicate 
these terms, for Milbank often uses them in ambiguous ways, without carefully defining what 
he means.  For example, although he endorses a correspondence theory of truth, his notion of 
‘correspondence’ differs significantly from the typical philosophical notion of mirroring facts 
to reality.  Similarly, he says that reason ultimately leads to nihilistic violence and 
uncertainty, and reason leads to certainty and peace – without explicitly distinguishing 
between secular reason and the reason of faith.  Therefore, this article also aims to clarify 
what Milbank himself means by these terms with reference to his work, and will 
consequently argue that he endorses a particular type of correspondence theory in contrast to 
the typical correspondence theory and other theories of truth, that he rejects secular reason in 
favour of faith united with reason, and also that he sees faith as trust or persuasion/rhetoric, 
participation in the divine which is fundamentally united to reason.  With these themes 
properly demarcated, it will foster a more effective interaction in regard to Milbank’s 
Christian theology and philosophy, creating a fertile plain for deeply exploring the nature of 
these fundamental concepts, as well as assisting the completion of Milbank’s beneficial 
critique of the secular. 
This article commences by introducing the theology of Radical Orthodoxy, of which 
Milbank is a leading proponent.  Milbank ultimately rejects the secular in favour of an 
ontology of peace based in faith, which implies an idiosyncratic correspondence theory of 
truth in contrast to other theories of truth.  This article subsequently moves to consider 
Milbank’s contentions regarding secular reason in more depth, before examining his rejection 
of this and promotion of the reason of faith and theology as paramount.  Finally, the article 
will conclude by providing concise working definitions of truth, faith and reason in 
Milbank’s theological framework, in order to provide an appropriate foundation for further 
research. 
 
A. Milbank and radical orthodoxy 
 
The theologians of radical orthodoxy lament the loss of transcendence and consequent 
secularisation of contemporary society, philosophy and culture.  This is because secularism 
promotes its own lack of values and meaning, and it promotes a materialism which is 
soulless, aggressive, nonchalant and nihilistic.  In response, radical orthodoxy (of which 
Milbank is a prominent member) seeks to reclaim the world by placing its concerns and 
activities within a theological framework, resituating them from a Christian standpoint in 
relation to the Trinity and Christology.  What emerges is a project made possible by the 
superficiality of contemporary secularism, and it views the nihilistic drift of postmodernism 
as an opportunity.  It does not seek to buttress universal accounts of human value and 
objective reason, but in the face of the secular demise of truth, it seeks to reconfigure 
theological truth.  The defining feature of radical orthodoxy is the proposal of an infinite 
interpersonal harmonious order as particularly manifested in Trinitarian relations and the 
event of Christ.
1
   
The phrase ‘radical orthodoxy’ as an identifying feature of this emerging movement is not 
haphazard or ill-chosen.  The theology it espouses is orthodox in the sense of its commitment 
to creedal Christianity and the patristic matrix, and more specifically of affirming a richer and 
more coherent original Christianity gradually lost subsequent to the Middle Ages.  It wishes 
to recover and extend a fully Christianised ontology and a practical philosophy consonant 
with authentic Christian doctrine.  Its theology is radical in the sense of a return to Christian 
roots and a rethinking of Christian tradition, and in the sense that such a vision should be 
deployed to boldly critique modern society and culture.
2
  Ultimately, the central theological 
framework of radical orthodoxy is participation in the eternal, divine and infinite, that every 
discipline must have a transcendent foundation/source and be framed by a theological 
perspective.
3
 
For Milbank, this participation occurs and is displayed through what he terms 
‘incarnational paradox’.  He deconstructs the word ‘paradox’ etymologically and describes it 
as an overwhelming or double glory (para-doxa) which is a coincidence of opposites 
somehow mysteriously persisted with that saturates our everyday reality.  It can be described 
as the analogical, constitutively relational, or the metaxological.
4
  Such a coincidence of 
opposites occurs in the Incarnation, the event of Christ where man and God are united, and 
where infinite meets finite and temporal meets eternal.  Milbank contends that this is the 
moment of true theology, and so all philosophy and reason must be framed in terms of this 
event in order to produce an ontology of peace, in contrast to the ontology of violence 
promoted by purely secular, nihilistic philosophy. 
Concordantly, Milbank sees philosophy as by nature completed by theology, and at the 
same time theology blends its intuitions with metaphysical reasoning and empirical appeal.
5
  
Hence, theology rejects secular reason in favour of the reason of faith, for secular philosophy 
cannot confirm the necessity of a determinate ontology as indicated by another sort of 
discourse.  The ontological question is only seriously posed and answered in practice, and 
only the practice of Christianity can assume all the traditional tasks of philosophy as 
metaphysics.  In contrast, philosophy cannot demarcate a Christian ontology.  It is theology 
and not philosophy which explains things, discovers reality as mediating action, and which is 
alone certainty and alone science.
6
  Milbank therefore suggests that another part of the work 
of radical orthodoxy is to undertake a theological critique of philosophy itself in its 
instantiation of the specifically modern dualism between reason and revelation.  The 
conception of reason as achieving truth only when it gives creative expression to its 
recognition of God as visible in the world is far more critically viable.  This creative 
expression of the visibility of God may be ‘seen’ through the Holy Spirit and the communion 
of believers, and their interaction with the divine through the poetic.  God is no longer 
categorised and limited by secular human abstraction, but experienced and trusted through 
metaphor.  Milbank consequently argues for knowledge on the basis of faith yet united with 
reason, whereby we allow that the visible (finite) affords some clue to the invisible (infinite), 
alone prevents nihilism.  Indeed, it is the invocation of secular reason to explain and observe 
God in a scientistic fashion which paradoxically renders the infinite God as just another 
natural phenomenon, and eventually leads to the collapse of reason itself into nihilism, since 
all that secular reason reveals is contingency.  Thus, it is knowledge through faith and 
personal trust in the divine through poetic communion of the visible which simultaneously 
recognises God and rescues reason by providing access to the necessary, or transcendent 
infinite invisible.
7
  It is because of this that Milbank also argues for the recognition and 
deconstruction of this ‘autonomous secular reason’.8  Thus, the conclusion of radical 
orthodoxy and the theology of Milbank is that only reason framed in theology can achieve 
truth, and such provides the context for a more detailed examination of what is meant by the 
term ‘truth’. 
 
 
 
B. The truth of theology: producing peace through trinitarian 
correspondence 
 
In the most fundamental way, Milbank takes Christianity to be the ‘absolute truth’.9  This is 
because truth is uniquely generated through the tri-personed love of the Trinity, where truth is 
never interpretively exhausted since the love is never finished, and is ultimately revealed in 
the Incarnation and sacrifice of Christ.
10
  Such is reflected in the etymology of aletheia, the 
word most often translated as ‘truth’ in the New Testament.  Aletheia is derived from alethes, 
which has its root in the combination of a, the first letter of the Greek alphabet and a particle 
used as a prefix to express a negation, with lanthano, a prolonged form of a primitive verb 
which means to be hidden, concealed, or secret.  Thus, the root form of aletheia expresses a 
meaning equivalent to the notion of negating a secret, revealing a thing that has been 
concealed, or exposing something hidden.
11
  This equivalence of revelation (revealing) with 
truth (and therefore concealing with lies/falsehood) provides the framework for considering 
the notion of truth in Milbank’s Christian theology.  An additional underlying implication of 
aletheia is that a concept or action objectively reflects reality, is according to fact, and is 
therefore certain.  Although truth has profound practical and ethical concern (and this is its 
primary focus in Christian theology), ontological reality and the possibility of notionally 
apprehending that reality is presupposed, and is central to understanding the Christian 
concept of truth.
12
  As such, truth is revealed as that which accords with the reality of the 
facts, and so is certain to be reliably trusted and personally obeyed.
 13
 
However, the model of the Trinity for truly expressing love is ostensibly problematic, for 
the Trinity has three members, so the love that exists between the divine persons is arguably 
perverse, rather than the more classic model of self and other.  The resolution is found in the 
function of the third member, the Holy Spirit, who produces and sustains the bond between 
the community of believers.  Thus, the love between Father and Son is perfect and infinite, 
and the Holy Spirit allows participation in this perfect and infinite (true) love through 
producing and sustaining the bond between those of faith, both with each other and with the 
divine relationship.  Indeed, the quest for a more human(e) world is the quest for a world 
where human aspiration for peace and existing reality can be brought into a state of identity, 
and human aspirations are only viable if they correspond with the way things ultimately are – 
that is, with the relationship between Father and Son.
 14
  Therefore, it would seem that that 
Milbank endorses what may be termed a ‘Christian’ or Trinitarian correspondence theory of 
truth.  It is only this truth which can produce the necessary identity between human 
aspirations and existing reality.  Indeed, the question of truth is deeply related to the question 
of identity and stability, even from a correspondence perspective.
15
  This view may be 
affirmed all the more strongly if its purely rational demonstrability is denied, and it is 
believed through faith, for only then can it be undergirded by belief in a transcendent, creator 
God.  Ultimately then, Milbank argues that theology is the only possible source for a political 
critique claiming to be grounded in ‘truth’ as correspondence, producing peace.16   
At this point it is edifying to explain what precisely is meant by a correspondence theory 
of truth.  The correspondence theory of truth is the view that a proposition is true just when it 
corresponds with reality.  Correspondence theorists must be able to articulate what has the 
property of truth (the truth-bearer), the nature of the correspondence (the truth relation), and 
the reality to which it corresponds (the truth-maker).
17
  Most correspondence theorists agree 
that a plausible candidate for the truth-bearer is the proposition, which Kirkham defines as an 
abstract, trans-linguistic entity which is the informational content of a complete sentence.  
They are not identical to sentence types, for sentence types are composed only of their 
members, while a proposition would still exist even if it had not been expressed with a 
sentence token.
18
  Furthermore, theorists such as Armstrong and Alston have convincingly 
outlined a more detailed system to describe the nature of the correspondence, so that the 
alleged problem of the correspondence relation is more frequently assumed than justified.
19
  
Finally, Armstrong aims to defend the contention that truthmakers exist for every truth (or 
true proposition), and does this with various types of propositions throughout his book.
20
   
There are two strong arguments for the plausibility of the correspondence theory.  The 
first is a phenomenological argument, which states that a person may actually experience the 
content of their thoughts corresponding to a certain state of affairs, and by comparing these 
‘see’ or be directly aware that the thought is true, such that truth itself is experienced and 
becomes an object of their awareness.  This need not be limited to sense-perceptible states, 
for one can also see the truth of abstract logical inferences.
21
  Some, such as Davies, reject 
this argument on the grounds that it is overly simplistic. However, it is a virtue of the 
correspondence theory that it corresponds to the reality that is experienced at the everyday 
level, and Davies admits this much.
22
  The second argument is a dialectical argument, that 
those who advance alternative theories or reject the correspondence theory actually 
presuppose it in their assertions, especially when they present arguments for their views or 
defend them against defeaters.  The argument may be stated in the form of a dilemma: those 
who reject the correspondence theory either take their own utterances to be true in the 
correspondence sense or they do not.  If the former, then those utterances are self-defeating, 
and if the latter, there is no reason to accept them as true.  The critic may respond that the 
second horn of the dilemma begs the question, and that they may not be offering their own 
utterances as true, or else they are offered as true in accordance with the coherence or 
pragmatic theory of truth.  However, when one reads the writings of correspondence 
detractors, one gains the impression that when they present arguments in support of their 
theories or cite examples of reality in support, they do in fact suppose their own utterances to 
be true in a correspondence sense.  For example, coherence theorists argue for coherence on 
the basis that beliefs are true because they do in fact cohere well with other beliefs, which 
would seem to assume a correspondence theory.  Furthermore, if they state that they are 
presenting their arguments in accordance with an alternative theory of truth, they have 
already begged the question in favour of that alternative theory of truth, invalidating their 
argument.
23
  Hence, the correspondence theory may be viewed as a plausible theory of truth. 
However, the correspondence theory defined in this way does not sit comfortably with 
some of Milbank’s other statements.  Milbank’s assumption is radically realist: there are no 
prior criteria for truth, since in that case truth would be governed by something other than 
truth, which would then be false.  Since the truth is the truth, it declares itself, with an 
apparentness uniquely characteristic of truth, so that it is self-authenticating.  There can be no 
method for seeking truth from the nature or structure of minds – for why should that be true 
and not an illusion – but instead, truth offers one some advanced glimmering of its own 
character.  Truth must be a gift from truth itself, which one must love and have faith in, and is 
ontologically fundamental, principally personal, and a contingent gift.
24
  Therefore truth, for 
Christianity, is not correspondence (in the sense of mirroring between a proposition in the 
mind and the facts of reality), but participation of the beautiful in the graciously revealed 
beauty of God.  The measure of truth is likeness to the form of divine beauty of which our 
soul has some recollection, and which has given or declared itself in a self-authenticating way 
rather than having been discerned in the mind.
25
   
Importantly, this concept of participation is clarified by Thomas Aquinas.  In articulating 
notions of truth, faith and reason, Milbank draws heavily upon Aquinas, engaging in a 
creative interpretation to construct what he conceives to be more robust iterations of these 
perennial themes.  Despite criticisms of Milbank’s appropriation or ‘interpretation’ of 
Aquinas, as one of the fundamental theorists of the relationship between faith and reason, 
theology and philosophy, Aquinas exhibits for Milbank an inordinate source of material for 
developing a Christian ontology capable of critiquing the secular, and so it is instructive to 
consider Aquinas in this context.
26
  Returning then to participation, Aquinas etymologically 
defines participation as simply taking a part of something.  More rigorously, he states that 
when something receives in particular fashion that which belongs to another in universal or 
total fashion, the former is said to participate in the latter.  Thus, when we find a quality or 
perfection possessed by a subject in only partial rather than total fashion, the subject is said to 
participate in that perfection.  Appeal to a participation structure also accounts for the fact 
that a given perfection may be shared to various degrees by different subjects, addressing the 
problem of unity in diversity, or the one and the many.
27
  The final point in particular is 
salient when one applies this Thomist notion of participation to human participation in the 
Trinitarian relationship.  Milbank attempts to resolve the problematic of divine simplicity 
held to by Aquinas, which in his view fails to reconcile the problem of unity and diversity, by 
postulating a fully Trinitarian ontology, where the difference of the three members of the 
Trinity is fully reconciled in their unity of the Godhead.
28
  Hence, not only is the problem of 
unity in diversity paradigmatically resolved in the community of the Tri-unity, but the perfect 
quality of love and peace present in the divine relationship is imparted to the community of 
believers to the extent that they also exhibit these qualities of love and peace, albeit 
imperfectly.  This love revealed that subsists between Father and Son is an infinite relation, a 
further difference which always escapes.
29
  As such, the Incarnation allows human or finite 
participation in the infinite relation through the believing community partially apprehending 
the totalising quality of Trinitarian love, leading ultimately to an ontology of peace and 
reconciliation.  Importantly, the human mind does not mirror or correspond to reality, but 
knowledge is true if divinely illumined by the logos.  Therefore, no positive reality can be 
false in terms of a mistake or noncorrespondence, but only false as deficient presence or 
being.
30
 
It follows from all this that Milbank’s simultaneous rejection and affirmation of truth as 
‘correspondence’ appears vague, and at times, ambivalent.  Therefore, a more specific 
analysis is required in order to determine what Milbank himself means by correspondence, 
and there will be an attempt to harmonise his statements with this in mind.  Such an analysis 
may be found in his attempt to recover and articulate a true correspondence theory through 
Aquinas, as alluded to earlier.  Milbank, writing with Catherine Pickstock, has turned to 
Aquinas in this regard because his view allows the retrieval of truth firstly as correspondence 
without redundancy and secondly as both theoretical and practical and a matter of both faith 
and reason, and finally allows that truth is accessible to the simplest apprehension and yet 
amenable to profound and learned exposition.  The notion of truth as correspondence is ‘in 
crisis’ only because it is taken in an epistemological rather than ontological sense.31   
The detractors argue that the correspondence theory must be abandoned since we have no 
unmediated access to reality, and instead disquotational or deflationary correspondence must 
be embraced, one which essentially reduces propositions of truth to that of being.  
Deflationary theories state that truth has no inherent nature.  The basic intuition is that the 
proposition p is true is superfluous, since p is and p is true are equivalent.  Thus, truth is 
equated with being and the notion of truth can be discarded and requires no explanation.
32
  
Milbank and Pickstock identify two primary problems with this position.  The first is that 
deflationists claim this is how truth really is, which would imply an inflationalist 
correspondence: ‘it is true that p is true’ where p = the correspondence theory of truth.  This 
makes no sense on a deflationist view.  Moreover, it leads to a contradiction, for this 
formulation nevertheless assumes correspondence to an (admittedly unverifiable) reality, and 
so is self-defeating.
33
  The second problem is that such a theory of truth further implies that 
truth is merely instrumental, and this is analogous to the reduction of truth to power relations, 
a secular position which Milbank categorically rejects.
34
  As such detractors are embracing an 
inherently secular conclusion, this implies that only a Thomist theological approach can save 
the correspondence theory of truth.
35
  Indeed, correspondence must resurface, since for the 
Christian one seeks to imitate Christ, who is the Truth.  So Aquinas’ account of truth is the 
incarnate Christ’s embodiment of the eternal truth (a Christological mode of correspondence 
where Christ the God-man is true in his imitation of the life of the eternal trinity), and our 
participation in this is by imitation of Christ.
36
   
However, in Aquinas we also see correspondence as a real ontological proportion 
between thought and being where these are regarded as transcendentally convertible.  Hence, 
truth does not simply reduce to our mode of apprehension of what actually is the case, but 
truth as correspondence is salvaged in the strong sense of participation in the divine being.
37
  
It is contended that one can only have correspondence at all if one has God, for truth as 
correspondence must be convertible with ultimate being. Secondly and in addition, such a 
correspondence theory is equally to be seen as a coherence theory, since the ultimate true 
being of things is their supreme intelligibility in the divine mind.  Finally, correspondence 
and coherence do not apply in the same way as according to secular canons.
38
  For 
correspondence, it is not simply a mirroring or reflection of reality in propositions (‘true to 
the facts’), but there is an analogy between the way things are materially and the way things 
are in our minds.
39
  According to the coherence theory in the secular canon, a belief is true if 
and only if it coheres with the entire set of one’s beliefs, assuming that the set itself is a 
strongly coherent one.  Thus the truth or falsity of a belief is not a function of its match with a 
real, external world, but of the belief’s relationship with other beliefs within one’s web of 
beliefs.  In other words, a proposition is true if it coheres with a system of propositions whose 
members cohere with one another.  By coherence, it is meant that there must be both 
consistency and connectedness between the set of propositions.
40
  Conversely, theological 
coherence refers to the ultimate truth of the being of things in terms of their supreme 
intelligibility in the divine mind, and therefore in this sense coherence is intrinsically 
connected to Thomist correspondence. 
Since truth is primarily in the mind of God, it follows that Aquinas’ realist theory of truth 
as correspondence of a mind to a thing is qualified by the subordination of all things to the 
divine mind.  The referral to the divine intellect entails that the idea is oriented towards the 
reality of things, and so the truth of God as contained in the divine mind is expressed in the 
reality of the created world produced from the divine mind.  It is real because truth, which 
exists in the mind, is convertible with being, the reality.
41
  Milbank and Pickstock ultimately 
conclude that: 
What all this suggests is that correspondence in Aquinas’s [sic] theory of knowledge 
means something far more nuanced than a mere mirroring of reality in thought… 
there is an intrinsic analogy between the mind’s intrinsic drive towards truth, and the 
way things manifest themselves, which is their mode of being true… if there can be 
correspondence of thought to beings, this is only because… both beings and minds 
correspond to the divine being and intellect.
42
   
 
Therefore, rather than correspondence being guaranteed by its measuring of the given, 
it is guaranteed by its conformation to the divine source of the given.  While to advance to 
this source is to advance to unknowing, it is only through unknowing, increased through 
faith, that we confirm even our ordinary knowing of finite things.
43
  In this formulation then, 
we begin to see reconciliation between Milbank’s ostensibly conflicting statements regarding 
the correspondence theory of truth.  Milbank’s notion of truth as correspondence consists not 
in a mirroring between propositions and the facts of reality, but in the unique, self-
authenticating gift of the revelation of the being of the Trinity and the divine mind through 
the Incarnation, which is participated in by humanity through imitation of what has been 
graciously revealed. 
Furthermore, since this truth of the divine being is the good and the good is peace and 
harmony, it is an ontology of peace which persuades people of the truth.  To opt for truth and 
peace is also to opt for the ultimate reality of reason, for reason then seeks roots in being.  
However, if there is no ultimate source and violence is ontologically intrinsic, reason is not 
sacred but is instead unreason/nihilism.  In the final analysis, only the persuasion to the 
ultimate truth of reason is rational.
44
  However, it is important to emphasise that Christianity 
does not claim that the true is self-evident to merely objective secular reason, but it instead 
first qualified philosophy as rhetoric in contending that the true are those things of which we 
are persuaded.  A rhetorical path to the true leads to the following implication: only 
persuasion of the truth can be non-violent, but truth is only available through persuasion.  
Therefore truth and non-violence have to be recognised as that by which we are persuaded 
(rhetoric or faith).
45
 
This notion of truth as persuasion harbours allusions to the discursive theory of truth 
promoted by Habermas.  Habermas summarises his own position as a proposition being true 
if it could win argumentatively reached agreement in an ideal speech situation.  In other 
words, what is true is may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions.  We can imagine 
what such an ideal situation would look like in regard to argumentative presuppositions of 
general inclusiveness, equal rights to participation, freedom from repression, and orientation 
towards reached understanding.  Acceptance of the validity of the proposition in question in 
such a situation constitutes truth, and argument remains the only available medium of 
ascertaining truth.
46
   
However, this actually leads to Habermas concluding that there is now a supposition 
of an independently existing reality about which we can state facts, and the truth of these 
facts is tested discursively.  It follows that ‘a proposition is agreed to by all rational subjects 
because it is true; it is not true because it could be the content of a consensus attained under 
ideal conditions’.47  Hence, Habermas seems to be articulating a realist theory of truth at least 
compatible with correspondence if not correspondence, in conjunction with his epistemic 
view that this truth may be verified through argumentation.
48
  In short, under the assumption 
of ideal conditions, all available arguments are considered and exhausted, and this entitles us 
to take a proposition as true.  However, ‘the proposition’s truth signifies a fact – the obtaining 
of a state of affairs’.  Since facts exist in a world or reality independent of our descriptions of 
them, no matter how carefully the consensus is established is justified, it may nevertheless 
turn out to be false in light of new evidence.
49
  Hence a correspondence theory is 
indispensable, and would even seem to render the adoption of a discursive theory of truth as 
superfluous. 
However, there is an even more devastating problem with adopting Habermas’ theory 
of discursive truth in conjunction with Milbank’s correspondence theory.  Milbank states that 
the notion of dialogue being a privileged mode of access to truth is a presupposition of 
liberalism, which he firmly rejects as secular or even neo-pagan – certainly not Christian.50  
Since dialogue as a privileged mode of access to truth essentially characterises Habermas’ 
theory, it must be rejected on pain of inconsistency with ‘true’ truth: Trinitarian 
correspondence.  This consequently begs the question of what exactly Milbank means by 
characterising truth as that of which we are persuaded, and the exact mechanism of this 
persuasion. The most plausibly consistent interpretation is that persuasion is apparently not 
that one is persuaded of truth by open intersubjective discourse, but rather one is persuaded 
through faith (pistis, literally ‘persuasion’) based on an unmerited revelation (aletheia, 
literally ‘truth’) of the divine word (logos, referring to Christ) .  In other words, it is the 
revelation of the divine word that persuades, or produces faith. 
Thus, what we find  is that truth is not merely correspondence in the abstruse and 
theologically neutral sense of propositions corresponding to states of affairs in reality, but 
rather that truth is correspondence in the far richer sense that it is aletheia, revealed by God.  
In particular, God himself reveals truth by demonstrating the Trinitarian relationship, that 
eternal relationship of love and perfect peace between Father, Son and Holy Spirit – or that 
law of love which corresponds with the created order through participation in the divine mind 
by faith.  This definition is multi-layered, and so requires a careful exposition.  In particular, 
the Trinitarian relationship is that of self-giving love, or loving the other as oneself, and it is 
perfect peace because is the epitomic display of the reconciliation between the One and the 
Many, or the universal and the particular.  The members of the Trinity co-exist in perfect 
harmony as one God, but three Persons.  This is superlative unity in diversity, and comm-
unity: unity in common with others.  The Tri-Unity, then, is the consummate example for 
love and ontological peace. 
This truth is primarily revealed through the Incarnation of Christ, the second member 
of the Trinity.  The Incarnation, God in flesh or becoming human, perfectly displays the grace 
of God through demonstrating the unmerited favour of Christ loving the created order by 
sacrificing and giving himself for the forgiveness of sins.  Therefore, Christ taking on human 
form and volunteering to die on the cross for people is the ultimate display of the self-giving 
love characteristic of the Trinity.  Its concern is for other and not self, and so it reveals a law 
beyond human law, a law of grace which becomes the law of love – to love your neighbour.  
It is this revelation of God’s love in Christ which is truth, or aletheia.  So although truth-as-
correspondence seems to be an appropriate theological definition of truth, it is fundamentally 
different from the typical meaning of the phrase.  One of the more important aspects of this 
difference is the relationship between revelation and rhetoric.  Historically, Christians have 
always understood that the beliefs grounding their ethics as being matters of faith, or 
persuasion (rhetoric).
51
  In particular, as the glory of Christ is revealed to the mind, the mind 
is persuaded, which is the same as saying the mind appropriates this revelation by peaceful 
persuasion or rhetoric, rather than the violent coercion of secular reason.  As the mind is 
transformed by faith, it participates in the glory of Christ by imitating Christ and then loves 
one’s neighbour as a reflection of the Trinitarian relations.  In this sense, the truth of 
Christianity is that the divine mind of the Trinity in its perfect love and peace as revealed in 
Christ recovers reason and corresponds to the created order through participation in the 
Trinitarian relations resulting from faith, the persuasion of the mind by the glorious truth of 
what has been graciously revealed.  Hence, the concrete virtue of loving one’s neighbour 
seeks its notion of what it means to have truly human character in a place beyond or above 
what is human, rather than in or beneath.
52
  Ultimately then, it is this necessary transcendence 
in human relations which challenges the secular and opens the space for faith.  For as 
Milbank argues, scholars have historically found it difficult to simultaneously point to the  
universally valid and objective and to the customary particulars which instantiate it… a 
solution is only really possible in terms of a tradition like Christianity, which starkly links 
particular to universal by conceiving its relationship to transcendence (truth) in a rhetorical 
fashion (faith).
53
   
 
To summarise, theological reason, if it is true to itself, contends that all other 
disciplines which claim to be about objects, regardless of whether those objects are related to 
God, are really about nothing at all.  Indeed, such disciplines are atheistic, and atheism is 
really a polite name for nihilism, absolute nothingness or void.  In this sense atheism appears 
to be more difficult and mystical than theology.  By contrast, theology understands itself as 
studying objects which are absolutely real, in that they take their source in original, 
indefeasible actuality of being.  Consequently, only theology alone can remain with the 
question of truth.  For theology, truth is an adequation or correspondence of knowledge with 
the real, since the one entirely real reality, God, is himself both infinitely real and infinitely 
knowing.  As real he is also manifest and self-aware, or truthful.  To express a truth then 
means to correspond in our being to God (to a degree) via an awareness of aspects of the 
creation to whose lesser reality we also correspond, since creation is sustained by God and 
has its being in God.  From this theological perspective alone it makes sense to say that 
knowing corresponds to being, even if this cannot be validated.  Hence a claim to know truly 
or to know at all amounts to a faith and participation in that which is the origin of all things 
and the depth of all things: the divine God.
54
  It follows that unless secular disciplines are 
explicitly ordered to Christian theology, they are objectively and demonstrably null and void, 
altogether lacking in truth, which to have any meaning must consist of correspondence 
between knowledge and the real in the fashion described.
55
  The fact that secular disciplines 
are not ordered to Christian theology is Milbank’s primary reason for rejecting them, as is the 
subject of the following two sections. 
 
C. Milbank’s rejection of secular reason… 
 
Davis states that Milbank’s fundamental aim is to interrogate the very foundation of 
(theological) reason, as opposed to modern secular reason which cannot be deployed against 
itself.  Consequently, uniting thought and action which are traditionally separated in modern 
thought, he asks questions regarding reason’s function, actions and limits.56  For Milbank, the 
secular means the nihilistic, and the nihilistic can only be resolved by a recovery of what 
secular reason initially refused, a social order grounded on virtue.  However, virtue of the 
Platonic/Aristotelian type, though correctly oriented, is insufficient due to antinomies which 
arise in their accounts – such as peace being a merely suspended violence.  However, 
Christianity provides a superior account based on its consistency, which links the particular to 
universal by conceiving its relationship as transcendence, and provides true peace.
57
   
Milbank illustrates this contrast between secular or pagan violence and a social order 
grounded on virtue by referring to Augustine.
58
  Milbank returns to Augustine for a number 
of interconnected reasons.  The first is that in Augustine, Milbank sees a precursor to himself 
in the sense that Augustine deploys a Christian Trinitarian ontology in a theologising of the 
(secular) Stoic sciences.  However, due to Augustine’s over-intellectualism and interiority, 
Milbank also sees him as the primary thinker to be re-interpreted and overcome in order to 
successfully arrive at a theology where God as being produces the good.
59
  This is the point at 
which Milbank acknowledges Augustine and departs from him – in Augustine we see the 
original possibility of a purely Christian critique of secular pagan violence, and the 
contrasting instantiation of the good (peace).
60
  Such is found in the City of God, where 
Augustine demonstrates that pagan ontology is inherently violent (for even the ‘roman peace’ 
is violence suspended by violent domination), as opposed to the City of God, which is 
ontologically peaceful.  For example, Augustine argues that the earthly (secular/pagan) city 
was founded on violence, and will continue in violence that leads to death: even victory in 
war will lead to death through arrogance inviting a violent overthrow.  However, he 
acknowledges that even the earthly city ultimately aims for peace, even if it cannot be 
attained.  By contrast, the heavenly city or the City of God possesses eternal and perfect 
peace intrinsically since God is our peace, and this peace is the final fulfilment of all human 
virtue.
61
  Therefore, in Christianity and the City of God, one has a virtue which is not 
deconstructible to mere difference, but also allows analogical difference, thus promoting an 
ontology of peace rather than violence, since Christian virtue ultimately seeks peace.
62
  This 
rejection of secular reason is provided through faith’s explications, and these arguments of 
theology which are a violent critique on what is false: the autonomous, exclusive citadel of 
secular reason.  But this violence is not received from theology itself, but from this reason’s 
implosion and self-dissolution as a function of the undoing of its violent self-assertion.
63
  
Hence, secular reason in its final form is still pagan and cultic, as it trades life for the nothing 
and only returns at the price of the obscuration of nothing – and this Milbank unequivocally 
rejects.
64
   
Another example of the violence of secular reason is the attempt of philosophy to exert its 
own paradigm in the market of ideas.  As discussed above, this has rendered the instantiation 
of truth as little more than the exercise of brutal and arbitrary power in the various domains 
of the world.  For Milbank, as a result, knowledge was exposed to be baseless and therefore 
not knowledge at all.  Hence the (re)turn to Christian theology is necessary as a way to 
establish an embodied and incarnated struggle for truth, since philosophy and theology have 
been inextricably linked, and indeed the destiny of philosophy is through the theological.
65
  
For instance, in contrast to liberalism, which he states is dominated by secular categories, 
Milbank contends that the theology of the Apostle Paul breaks with the collusion of secular 
logic by offering an alternative vision of the resurrection which returns justice to the world.
66
  
Milbank further shows that the intellectual constructs of the secular rest on preferences for 
some types of theology and rejection of orthodox Christian teachings, and that these 
assumptions are arbitrary and not objectively warranted.  In this way, he demonstrates that all 
secular theories assume violence as an ontological feature of existence and are primordially 
violent, as opposed to Christianity which has an ontology of peace and is intrinsically 
peaceful and harmonious.   
Milbank notes this is emblematic of the fact that ‘once secular reason has exposed its own 
efforts to ground itself in the universal, then its advocacy of a polity and an ontology which is 
confined to the (non)regulation of conflict through conflict emerges clearly to view.’67  In 
other words, in any discipline governed by a universalising secular reason which excludes the 
subjectivity of faith, its ‘regulation’ of the violent discipline through violence is 
demonstrated.  Hence, (secular) reason has to add power to its truth, even though power 
(violence) is absolutely external to truth.  Though reason aims to rule through reason, it finds 
it must supplement itself with a rule of force.
68
  Consequently, secular reason is revealed as 
blind faith which cannot sustain itself but through violence. 
So modern secularity is a mix of the heterodox, neopagan and antireligious, and with the 
rejection of these religious elements the humanism of secular modernity is logically bound to 
become postmodern nihilism.  Such a position is no more inherently reasonable than 
Christianity, and so Christianity is preferable since it allows differences to coexist peacefully.  
Indeed, this prevailing duality of reason and faith is a secular modern construct, not a 
Christian one – this theology must not and cannot conform to secular reason, but nor is it a 
Barthian fideism.
69
  The need to avoid these two extremes necessarily begs the question of 
the precise nature and definition of faith and the reason of theology, and this is what the next 
section seeks to answer. 
 
D. … And his promotion of faith and the reason of theology 
 
The orientation of the secular to the nihilistic (or blind faith) consequently cannot be opposed 
by redeeming enlightenment reason.  Rather, this secular reason can be confronted with the 
faith of Christian theology manifesting in virtue reconciled with difference.
70
  This is because 
a Christian perspective saves the human bias toward reason, for reason in the framework of 
virtue and difference is consistent with the infinite through participation in the divine virtue 
and leaves no residue of chaos through allowing difference.  In other words, rationalism is 
linked to the biblical mythos alone, and to save reason in this fashion requires the 
supplementation of reason by faith, including faith in infinite reason.71  There are two ways in 
which this occurs, and the first can be seen as Milbank again deferring to Aquinas and 
Augustine.  According to Aquinas, all human rationality is participation in the divine reason, 
and therefore all knowledge requires faith.  The light of revelation strengthens our grasp of 
natural principles, and consequently theology mediates knowledge in all other disciplines.
72
  
Indeed, Aquinas understood good reason to be an attentive reception, via the mediation of the 
senses and discursive operations of the divine light of the logos.  This is in fundamental 
keeping with Augustine, who argued that only lovers of God were able to gain true wisdom, 
for the corrupt and limited nature of human reason requires the purification and sharpening of 
faith.
73
  As such, good reason can only be such if it is based in faith.
74
  Therefore, Milbank 
argues to reason truly one must be already illumined by God, while revelation itself is just a 
higher measure of illumination, conjoined intrinsically and inextricably with a created event 
which symbolically discloses that transcendent reality, to which all created events to a lesser 
degree point.  This event is the Incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the 
God-man.  In other words, instead of grafting faith onto a base of reason, faith is fundamental 
in seeking to elaborate a Christian logos, or a reason which bears the marks of the 
Incarnation.
75
   
 
The nature of the Incarnation and the Trinity itself is the second, and probably more 
fundamental, method of combating secular reason with faith and reason united in Christian 
theology – and this is where Milbank, tipping his hat as it were to Augustine and Aquinas, 
goes beyond them.  In terms of the nature of the Trinity, thinking an infinite differentiation 
which is also harmony is what grounds the reconciliation of difference with virtue.  For the 
paganism of antiquity, the absolute was chaotic, and Being is infected with this chaos since 
the only discourse which can include both the same and the different is itself a discourse of 
difference, not a discourse of reason.  The extreme response of Voluntarist theology, or the 
emphasis of the absolute unity and simplicity of God (i.e. equating him with Being) is also 
one of the sources of secular reason since it does not take account of difference.  Hence, the 
only transcendental, self-identical reality is an empty will or force which returns as the 
arbitrary and chaotic different.  Thus, to save reason, one must derive it from an entity which 
lies beyond Being and beyond mere difference.
76
    This entity is the Trinitarian God of 
Christian theology, which is simultaneously Being as the divine and difference in the divine 
persons, peace in unity and diversity, and the reconciliation of virtue and difference.  A 
Christian ontology can therefore provide the foundation for taking account of difference and 
producing a reason compatible with faith and which is ontologically peaceful as a function of 
the Trinitarian relations.  Such cannot be arrived at by the operation of secular reason, but is 
rather revealed through faith and is a result of faith.
77
  In addition, the Incarnation of Christ 
reveals the peace inherent in the Trinitarian relations by reconciling the temporal and the 
eternal.  For Christ as fully God is eternal, but simultaneously as fully man is temporal, and, 
this also recovers the reality of reason united with faith.  Consequently, though reason is 
directed towards truth, it is not in the crude sense of secular reason discovering the nature of 
physical reality and systemising it to a set of propositions.  Instead, the process is inverted 
and theologised, with truth revealing itself through the Incarnation of Christ, reconciling 
reason with faith and recovering it.  This revelation is subsequently apprehended and 
participated in by faith. 
What may consequently be observed is the ultimate failure of secular reason and the 
corresponding displacement of secular reason by a reason combined with faith to discern the 
truth of nature.  Pure (or secular) reason is supposedly able to resolve the four fundamental 
Kantian antinomies: beginning/no beginning, freedom/causality, ultimate constituent parts/no 
such parts, and necessary being/contingent being.  However, following Kant, since these 
cannot be conceptualised by the understanding, any transcending of the antinomies becomes 
a pure act of faith, not a necessity of reason.
78
  Indeed, it is only through the Trinity and 
Incarnational paradox of Christ (or specifically Christian faith) that these antinomies can be 
transcended.  For as we have already seen in the Trinity, difference and sameness, or ultimate 
constituent parts/no such parts, is transcended.  In addition, Incarnational paradox transcends 
beginning/no beginning (for Christ is both temporal man and eternal God), freedom/causality 
(for Christ’s incarnation was necessary as a matter of fulfilling Scripture, and free as an act of 
love), and necessary/contingent being (for Christ is a necessary being as God, and a 
contingent being as a man).  So with Christian faith comes the transcending of the 
antinomies, and with that the recovery of reason – for the eternal/becoming distinction in 
Christ is universal and is what makes reason possible.
79
   
Hence, the meeting of the temporal and the eternal in Christ leads to the recovery of 
reason, for reason is recovered in the betweenness or paradox of (incarnational) being, where 
finite belonging to the infinite is the order of things, where time meets eternity, absence 
meets presence, and immanence meets transcendence.
80
  In other words, reason is united to 
faith at the paradoxical interface of the universal (reason) and the particular (faith), which is 
the event of Christ, for this allows the reconciliation of virtue and difference.  On this point of 
elaborating a reason from the Incarnation, only the qualification of reason by myth and poetry 
ensures that reason will not degenerate into pure abstraction.  The Bible, especially the New 
Testament, resists the advance to pure abstraction by reinvoking the poetic, yet in a nonpagan 
way which seeks a positive relationship to the properly vague abstraction of nondogmatic 
reason (for example, the wisdom literature and New Testament engagement with Greek 
philosophy).
81
  The balance is proclaimed paradoxically in the idea that reason itself (logos) 
becomes Incarnate, which means the rational is fully and only accessible by the indirectness 
of a poetic discourse concerning this event.  Reason thus is more realistically rational as 
disclosing a rational though mysterious universe.
82
  Again, this is because the discourse of 
poetry in Christian theology promotes the recognition of difference through subjectivity and 
particularity, and the creative difference of the Trinity, in contrast to the stifling and 
universalising nature of secular reason.  Thus, secular reason is ultimately blind faith and 
leads to an ontology of violence, while reason united to faith in Christian theology is unique 
in allowing true reason to flourish through the reconciliation of virtue and difference, 
producing an ontology of peace. 
Fundamentally, even this very notion of a revelation/reason duality, far from being an 
authentic Christian legacy, itself results only from the rise of a questionably secular mode of 
knowledge.  Indeed, if the truth of nature lies in its supernatural ordination, then reason is 
true only to the extent that it seeks or declares the theoretical and practical acknowledgement 
of this ordination, which is made possible again by the divine incarnation.  Hence there can 
be no reason/revelation duality – true reason anticipates revelation, while revelation simply is 
of true reason which must ceaselessly arrive, as an event, such that what Christ shows 
supremely is the world as really world, as the creation of God.
83
 
It may be further observed that faith is actually a presupposition of reason, which 
implies that the notion and system of ‘secular reason’ is self-referentially absurd.  For if there 
are no absolute foundations based in faith then argument between different positions is 
precluded and pragmatically absurd.  Any arguments which aim to go beyond tautology have 
to assume areas of given agreement, and to win an argument means to show the contradiction 
of alternative positions.  Therefore, outside a horizon of shared faith (or ‘common feeling’) 
no arguments would get off the ground.
84
  Hence, beyond the level of formal logic there is no 
single ‘reason’ without presuppositions, there are only many different, complexly 
overlapping traditions of reason.
85
  It follows that if theology is to be a logos and have a right 
to speak, it must be in some fashion convincing in itself, rather than a mere expression of a 
‘faith’ wrongly thought of as preceding a rational and linguistic reflection.86  For Milbank, 
theology’s historical problem is that it has sought to borrow from other disciplines a 
fundamental account of society and history, but it has been shown that no such fundamental 
account exists, and so the attempt has been unconvincing.  As such, theology itself will have 
to provide an account of human history on the basis of its own particular and historically 
specific Christian faith.
87
   
Conversely, nihilism is the true destiny of secular reason, and is without hope, yet its 
proponents continue to hope without reason.  This leads us to an appropriate point to define 
what is meant by ‘faith’.  If hope is without foundation in reason, then its positive stance to 
the future must belong to a trust in the unknown, or faith.  Faith does not claim to know 
anything: pistis (to trust or be persuaded) is not to be confused with gnosis.  Faith trusts the 
unknown and renders it personal, though it does not know a person: it merely trusts.
88
  
Milbank defines faith and trust interchangeably: to trust is to have faith in, and to have faith is 
to trust.
89
  It follows that there are not many faiths, but one faith – a trust in the transcendent 
God that involves being persuaded by the divine word beyond the scope of secular reason.
90
  
It is a trust in specifically disclosive sacramental processes of mediation between the 
universal and the particular, mind and reality, the intellect and the senses.
91
  Thus, in the final 
analysis, faith in the Triune God is a recognition of and trust in the transcendental/ontological 
possibility of participation in the infinite/divine.
92
  Since this faith construes the universal 
sway of difference as analogical, by faith the proclamation is made that theology is a meta-
discourse, and pure reason is viewed as private reason.
93
   
In short, pure secular reason (even when modest) always courts danger and drives us 
to the accomplice of violence in knowing, and to dread in ignorance.  Secular reason itself is 
finally uncertain.
94
  For without God, nothing becomes as real and actual as actuality itself.  
This is the irrational conclusion which reason must reach.  Only the transgression of reason 
by faith establishes commonsense reason which requires the priority of the actual.
95
  It is 
worth noting that in this context Milbank also importantly distinguishes the object of his 
argument from that in Theology and Social Theory: here the object of philosophy (being) is 
not denied, but it is instead argued that the pursuit of being by pure reason will reach aporetic 
and nihilistic conclusions.  Reason therefore cannot ground the rational disclosure of being, 
and so by faith disclosure (truth as aletheia) remains possible.  Thus, theology saves reason 
and fulfils and preserves philosophy, but secular philosophy left to its own devices brings 
itself, as Heidegger saw, to an end.
96
   
To conclude then, discursive reason should recognise that it operates within strict 
limits and is therefore not competent to pronounce judgment against metaphysical or 
religious positions.  The best metaphysically speculative practitioners admit that a certain 
stance of faith is involved.  Hence, if one restricts reason to the formal and insists it only 
operates in knowable boundaries, one may encourage entirely irrational and emotive political 
movements that are inherently violent.  The converse implication of this is that the 
combination of reason and faith necessarily leads to a theological ontology of peace through 
revelation of Trinitarian relations and Incarnational paradox.
97
  Milbank further argues that 
any sharp separation of reason and faith is dangerous, because it implies that faith at its core 
is non-rational and beyond the reach of argument, while simultaneously implying that reason 
cannot impact on issues of substantive preference.  But in reality, reason and faith are always 
intertwined in a beneficial way.  Reason has to make certain assumptions and trust or have 
faith in the reasonableness of reality.  Faith has to continuously think through the coherence 
of its own intuitions in a process that often modifies these intuitions.  Thus, critical faith 
becomes a more reflective mode of feeling, and reason has always to some degree to feel its 
way forward.
98
   
 
 
E. Summary reflection: working Milbankian definitions of truth, faith 
and reason 
 
This article has aimed to construct working definitions of truth, faith and reason within the 
framework of Milbank’s theology in order to provide a foundation for future work with these 
concepts.  It commenced by contextualising Milbank within the greater theological 
movement of Radical Orthodoxy, exploring how this movement as a whole and Milbank as 
an individual within the movement simultaneously seek to reclaim faith and theology as an 
autonomous and ‘reasonable’ meta-discipline from the dominance of secular(ised) reason.  
This project of Milbank and Radical Orthodoxy is a commendable endeavour, for theology 
possesses considerable scope to critique the trenchant secularism in much of contemporary 
philosophy, and re-orient philosophical discourse in terms of theology.  The further fact that 
there appears to be a movement towards the appropriation of theology by contemporary 
secular philosophy also occasions a critique of these underlying secular assumptions such as 
the divorce of faith and reason, in order to provide a more coherent basis with which to adopt 
theology and mediate knowledge through the peace of theology.  However, a factor which 
could tend to limit the impact of Radical Orthodoxy is its inclination to utilise ambiguous and 
ambivalent language, often without clarifying the meaning of this language.  This article has 
identified such an issue with regard to Milbank’s work, and has sought to address it through 
clarifying his fundamental concepts of truth, faith and reason.  Thus, one can proceed from 
this basis to more effectively critique the violent ontology of the secular. 
 
Indeed, as has been seen, Milbank rejects such an ontology and promotes an ontology 
of peace where truth is the gracious revelation of the divine Trinitarian relations through 
Incarnational paradox, in conjunction with the ‘correspondence’ of personal participation in 
this relationship of the divine by faith.  Since Trinitarian relations are intrinsically 
characterised by love and peace, such truth and participation in the truth also promotes an 
ontology of peace.  However, the rejection of hegemonic secular reason does not result in a 
Barthian fideism, where faith is antithetical to or divorced from the operations of reason.  
Rather, faith is trust in and persuasion of the truth and occurs through the gracious disclosure 
of this truth by the truth – namely, the Trinitarian relation of love and peace revealed in the 
Incarnation.  This faith both illumines and is articulated by reason through participation in the 
divine reason, which allows both critical reflection and reliant trust in God.  The articulation 
of reason is found in the Incarnated Christ, the logos which is the sum and genesis of all 
reason as it is the divine reason, and reason is therefore the recognition of God as visible in 
the world.  It is also worth noting that truth, faith and reason are mutually interdependent in 
Milbank’s framework, such that each entails the others and one cannot exist without the 
others.  Truth assumes participation in the divine mind by faith, and participation in the 
divine mind or reason constitutes reason.  Faith depends on being persuaded by the revelation 
of truth by the truth of the Trinitarian relations and Incarnational paradox, which reveals the 
divine mind and demonstrates the logos as the divine reason.  And reason only achieves truth 
through the creative expression of its recognition of God in the world by faith.  Reason 
consequently requires the persuasion of faith by the truth to avoid becoming secular or ‘pure’ 
reason, which Milbank fundamentally rejects.  In this way, a framework of truth, faith and 
reason is provided which stands as a foundation in the utilisation of Milbank to further 
develop these central notions in philosophical theology. 
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